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Regulation FD Will Result
in Poorer Disclosure and
Increased Market Volatility

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 27, 1999, a group of investors and an analyst from Credit
Suisse First Boston ("CSFB") toured Compaq's headquarters.' One investor
asked if it was true that sales for the quarter were weaker than expected A
company representative affirmed the rumor.' The CSFB analyst telephoned
his key clients to give them the hot information about Compaq's expected
quarterly earnings.' The following morning, before most of Compaq's
shareholders and analysts at other prestigious Wall Street firms received the
projected earnings information, Compaq's share price fell sixteen percent
The Compaq share price drop led to an industry-wide drop in share price.'
In an effort to end this kind of selective disclosure and resultant unfair
insider advantage, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
enacted Regulation FD (the "Regulation"), for "fair disclosure."7
The following Section briefly discusses securities regulation leading to
the enactment of the Regulation The Regulation is outlined and analyzed
in Section III.' Section IV discusses the impact of the Regulation.'" Finally,
Section V concludes this article."

1. Susan Pulliam & Gary McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticized for How It Disclosed PC
Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at Cl.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Proposed Rule Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591-92
(Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249).
8. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-175 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 176-244 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 245-251 and accompanying text.
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II.

HISTORY

The goal of securities legislation has always been the creation and
maintenance of a fair market.'" In the years directly preceding the market
crashes of the late 1920s and early 1930s, investors both small and large
purchased an aggregate of approximately fifty billion dollars in securities.' 3
About half of these securities were fraudulent and ultimately worth
nothing.'4 In the middle of the Great Depression, it was thought that the
economy could not recover unless investors regained their confidence in the
stock market.'" To restore investor confidence by providing government
regulation, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (the "'33 Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34 Act").'6
Regulation FD was proposed by the SEC on December 28, 1999.'" The
comment period for the proposed regulation ended on March 29, 2000.8 On
August 10, 2000, the SEC met to pass the final Regulation,'9 which went into
effect on October 23, 2000.20
III. REGULATION FD
The Regulation (i) makes illegal (a) intentional' dissemination of
material, 22 non-public23 information by certain members of senior
management of a reporting company24 if the issuer does not
contemporaneously make public disclosure of the information; and (b)
failure to make public disclosure within twenty-four hours of information
that a reporting company's high level executive discovers has been
inadvertently selectively disclosed;' (ii) resolves the split in case law created
by the circuit courts regarding the scienter element of insider trading so that
in order to be guilty of insider trading, a person must have traded "on the

12. See generally infra Sections IIl
and IV and accompanying notes.
13. Creation of the SEC, at http://www.sec.gov/asec/wwwsec.htm#create (last modified Aug. 8,

2000).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Proposed Rule Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,590.
Id.
Kevin A. Hassett, Outlaw Selective Disclosure? No, the More Information the Better, WALL

ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at A18.
20. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
21. See infra Section III(A)(3)(c) and accompanying notes.
22. See infra Section III(A)(3)(a) and accompanying notes.
23. See infra Section IlI(A)(3)(b) and accompanying notes.
24. See infra Section III(A)(2) and accompanying notes.
25. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see generally infra notes
113-120 and accompanying text.
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basis of' insider knowledge;26 and (iii) sets forth a three-factor test for
determining when a duty of trust or confidence is owed by a person in a nonbusiness relationship with the issuer. 2' Regulation FD does not create a
private cause of action: only the SEC can bring an action to enforce the
Regulation.2 ' Registered offerings 29 and foreign issuers are exempted. °
While the Regulation addresses both selective disclosure and insider trading
law issues, most of the uproar in the securities community has been about
ending selective disclosure."
A.

Prohibitionof Selective Disclosure

1. Scope
The scope of the Regulation is designed to minimize the effects of the
Regulation on communications in the issuer's ordinary course of business,
communications between the issuer and the government, and disclosures to
the media. 2 The SEC concedes that although customers, suppliers, strategic
partners of a company, news organizations, or government agencies could be
holders of an issuer's securities, any use of selectively disclosed information
by these parties would be an insider trading violation, regardless of the new
law announced by the Regulation.3 Therefore, issuer communications with
these parties did not need to be covered by the Regulation.'
a. Covered persons
The Regulation stated that, absent the showing of an exclusion, 3"
selective disclosures may not be made to securities market professionals and
their associated persons and, in certain situations, to holders of the issuer's

26.
notes
27.
notes
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727-29; see generally infra
148-160 and accompanying text.
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,729-31; see generally infra
168-175 and accompanying text.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
Id. at 51,725 n.79-82.
Id. at 51,724-25.
See infra notes 176-193 and accompanying text.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724-25.
Id. at n.27.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724-25.
See infra Section III(A)(1)(c) and accompanying notes.

securities. 6 The Regulation applies to broker-dealers, investment advisers,
some institutional investment managers, investment companies, and hedge
funds and affiliated persons, including sell- and buy- side analysts and
managers of large institutional investors.37 The Regulation uses the
definitions of these terms previously enacted into federal securities law,"
with one exception.39 The Regulation applies to other holders of an issuer's
securities only if it is reasonably foreseeable that the other holder would
purchase or sell securities based on the disclosure."0
b.

Issuers Subject to the Regulation

The Regulation applies to all issuers who have registered securities
under Section Twelve of the '34 Act and all issuers who are required to file
reports under Section 15(d) of the '34 Act. However, non-closed-end
investment companies, foreign governments, and foreign private issuers are
not subject to the Regulation." In the final draft of the Regulation, the SEC
noted that foreign private issuers are required by self-reporting organization
rules and policies to make timely disclosures of material information. 2
Selective disclosure in connection with registered offerings and shelf
offerings by issuers otherwise subject to the Regulation is not covered by the
Regulation because relevant provisions of the '33 Act already curtail
disclosures during the registration process.43
c.

Exclusions

The Regulation allows selective disclosure to broker-dealers, investment
advisers, some institutional investment managers, investment companies,
and hedge funds and affiliated persons, including sell- and buy- side analysts

36. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719-20.
37. Id. at 51,719.
38. Id. at 51,720 n.26.
39. The Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Company Act") defines an "affiliated person" as
(A) one who controls five percent of the voting securities of a company; (B) one who is five percent
controlled by an investment company; (C) those under common control; (D) an officer, director,
partner, copartner or employee of the person; (E) an investment advisor to an investment company;
or (F) a depositor of an unincorporated investment company. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(3)(A)-(F) (2000). The Regulation narrowed the definition of "affiliated person" by
eliminating (A) and (B) from the above definition. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,720 n.26.
40. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
41. Id.at7l,524.
42. Id. (citing NASDAQ Rules 4310(c)(16) and 4320(e)(14); and NYSE Listed Company
Manual, § 2).
43. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725-26. See Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
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and managers of large institutional investors in certain situations." The first
two exclusions apply to those who agree to keep information confidential.45
The Regulation did not need to cover communications covered by the first
two exclusions because insider trading laws already guard against misuse of
information by those who have assumed a duty of confidence. 6
The first exclusion is for communications with "temporary insiders"
such as attorneys, investment bankers, and accountants who owe the issuer a
duty of trust or confidence when the communication is made.47 The second
exclusion applies to communications between the issuer and "any person
' If
who has expressly agree[d] to maintain the information in confidence."48
the issuer and the recipient have a confidential relationship, but the issuer
and an organization with which the recipient is involved do not, the
Regulation will not be violated when selective disclosure is made to the
individual, but not the organization, with whom the issuer enjoys a
confidential relationship. For example, suppose an issuer has a confidential
relationship with a buy-side analyst for an investment banking firm.5" If the
issuer discloses information to the buy-side analyst, the issuer will not be
deemed to have disclosed information to the investment bank generally or to
other departments of the investment bank." Conversely, the confidential
relationship with the buy-side analyst would not create a confidential
relationship with the investment bank or other analysts in the investment
bank. 2 Therefore, if the issuer made a selective disclosure to a sell-side
analyst on the basis of its confidential relationship with a buy-side analyst,
the issuer would violate the Regulation. 3
The third exclusion covers selective disclosure to credit ratings
organizations for the purpose of creating a publicly disclosed credit rating.
The SEC excluded these disclosures because the purpose of selective

44. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 51,719.
47. Id. at 51,720.
48. Id. The agreement must be express, but it need not be written. Id. at n.28. Also, the issuer
must secure the agreement before making the disclosure; however, an agreement obtained after
disclosure but before the recipient discloses or trades on the basis of the information will be
sufficient. Id. n.28.
49. Id. at n.29.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
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disclosure to a ratings agency is to create public information." Therefore, it
is in the public interest to allow this flow of information to remain
unhindered by the Regulation 56
The fourth exclusion covers communications made in connection with a
majority of offerings of securities registered under the '33 Act. 7
Communications in connection with public offerings are already closely
regulated by Section Five of the '33 Act.5
2.

Issuer Persons Whose Communications Are Affected

The Regulation only governs communications from "persons acting on
behalf of an issuer." 9 While the proposed Regulation included in the
definition of "person[s] acting on behalf of the issuer" all officers, directors,
employees, and agents who disclosed material, non-public information
"while acting within the scope of [their] authority," the final draft of the
Regulation narrows the scope of the Regulation.' Commenters within the
legal community criticized the original definition as overly broad,6' but
another commenter suggested the definition ought to be broader in order to
prevent evasion." Yet another commenter suggested that the proposed
definition would be acceptable only if the scope of the Regulation were
limited to communications with analysts and institutional investors. 6 In
response, the SEC changed the definition in the final draft of the
Regulation.' The SEC's goal in altering the definition of "persons acting on
behalf of an issuer" was to ensure that the Regulation governs
communications from senior management, investor relations personnel, and

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
59. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
60. Id. at 51,720.
61. Id.Comment letters from the American Bar Association, the American Corporate Counsel
Association, and Cleary Gottlieb so criticized the proposed Regulation. Id. at n.31.
62. Id. PricewaterhouseCoopers suggested this change. Id. at n.32.
63. Id. The Business Roundtable made this suggestion. Id. at n.33.
64. Id.
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6
others to whom market professionals and security holders look regularly
for company information.'
In the final draft of the Regulation, the definition of "person acting on
behalf of the issuer" included: (i) "any senior official of the issuer";67 or (ii)
"any other officer, employee or agent of an issuer who regularly
communicates" with any of the following persons: (a) broker, dealer, or
anyone associated with a broker or dealer;68 (b) investment advisor,69
institutional investment manager" who filed a Form 13F' "for the most

recent quarter" ended before the disclosure," or any person associated with

an investment advisor or an institutional investment advisor;73 (c) investment

65. The Regulation provides some guidance as to what might be considered "regular"
communication: the SEC states that the rule is meant to focus on "those whose job responsibilities
include dealing with securities market professionals and security holders, acting in those
capabilities." Id. at n.36. The Regulation is not meant to cover communications from employees
who do not and are not expected to communicate with market professionals. Id. For example, if an
analyst sought out the store manager of a single retail franchise in a chain of stores owned by a
company that the analyst was investigating, the store manager's conversation with the analyst would
not be covered by the Regulation. Id.
66. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
67. Id. "Senior officials" include directors, executive officers, investor or public relations
officers, or those with similar functions. Id. With respect to closed-end investment companies, the
Regulation applies also to senior officials of the issuer's investment adviser. Id.
68. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) (2000). The Regulation relies on the definition of
these terms in Section 3(A) of the '34 Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,720; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000); and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (2000).
69. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(1)(ii). The Regulation relies on the definition given in Section 202(a)(11) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act"). Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,720; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000); and Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000).
70. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000). "Institutional investment manager" is defined in Section 13(0(5) of the
'34 Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(l)(ii) (2000); and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A) (2000).
71. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000). Subpart A of the '34 Act states that institutional investment managers who
exercise discretion over accounts with an aggregate fair market value of at least $100,000,000 on the
"last trading day of any month of any calendar year" must file a report on Form 13F. 17 C.F.R. §
240.13f-l(a)(1) (2000). Reports on Form 13F are governed by Subpart D to the '34 Act. See 17
C.F.R. § 249.325 (2000).
72. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243. 100(b)(1)(ii) (2000).
73. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000). The Regulation uses the definition of "person associated with an
investment adviser or institutional investment manager" given in Section 202(a)(17) of the Advisers
Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2000); and 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(17) (2000).

company" or affiliated person of an investment company;" or (d) issuer's
security holder. 6 However, an issuer cannot evade the Regulation by
directing an employee who is not otherwise covered by the Regulation to
make a selective disclosure." If a member of senior management were to
direct a non-covered employee to make a selective disclosure, that member

of senior management would be responsible for making the selective
disclosure." The SEC adopted as proposed the rule that an issuer would not
be liable under the Regulation when an issuer employee made a selective
disclosure in breach of a duty of non-disclosure to the issuer."

3. Definitions of key terms
a.

"Material"

The Regulation did not alter the definition of "material" that has been
established in securities case law. " Information as to a historical event is
material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important" when making an investment decision." If, in the view
of a reasonable investor, the information would "significantly alter[] the
'total mix' of information," then it is material. "2 With respect to prospective
74. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243. 100(b)(1)(iii) (2000). The Regulation relies on the definition of "investment company" as used
by Section 3 of the Company Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720;
see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (2000); and 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000). However, the
Regulation applies to those who are excepted from the definition of "investment company" by
Sections 3(c)(1) and (7) of the Company Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,720; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (2000); and 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000).
75. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243. 100(b)(l)(iii) (2000). "Affiliated person" is defined in Sections 2(a)(3)(C)-(F) of the Company
Act. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(b)(l)(ii) (2000); and 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(C)-(F) (2000).
76. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. In other words, an issuer would not be liable under the Regulation if its employee improperly
tipped. Id. However, the employee might still be liable under existing insider trading law and
applicable law regarding controlling person liability. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78t-1 and 78u-1 (2000); see also generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)
(holding that a fiduciary is liable for insider trading when he trades on the basis of misappropriated
material, non-public information).
80. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721; see also, e.g., infra notes
81-83 and accompanying text.
81. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 US. 438, 449 (1976)); see also Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2000); Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2000); and Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99 (Aug. 12, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (defining materiality with respect to financial statement
disclosures).
82. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (quoting TSC Industries,
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or "soft" information, information is material if either the probability or the
magnitude of the importance of the event is high. 3
Many commenters expressed opinions regarding the failure of the
Regulation to define the term "material."' Some commenters worried that
an attempt to define materiality with respect to the Regulation would have
implications in other areas of federal securities law. 5
Industry
representatives, securities attorneys, and some issuers and issuer advocates
claimed that using the materiality standard established by case law would
cause difficulties for issuers. 6 The latter group of commenters expressed
fears that issuer personnel, faced with the need to make real time judgments
regarding the materiality of a disclosure (a task many attorneys would find
daunting), would elect instead to make no disclosure at all.87 These
commenters predicted that the vagueness of the materiality standard would
lead to litigation and a chilling effect on disclosure generally.88 The SEC
refused to give a bright-line test or to provide an exhaustive list of material
communications.
The policy reason given for this refusal was that
securities laws must be kept flexible so that enforcement of the laws can
vary on a case by case basis.' Nevertheless, the Regulation contained a list
of things that "should be reviewed carefully to determine" materiality." The

426 U.S. at 449).
83. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (holding that materiality for contingent
or speculative events depends on a balancing of the probability of the event and the magnitude of the
effect the event would have, considered in light of total company activity).
84. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
85. Id. The Regulation mentions specifically the Financial Executives Institute and the North
American Securities Administrators Association.
86. Id. Specifically, the American Bar Association, the Association for Investment Management
and Research, the Association of Publicly Traded Companies, Bank One, Cleary Gottlieb, Goldman
Sachs, the Investment Company Institute, the New York City Bar Association, the Securities
Industry Association, and Sullivan and Cromwell posed this criticism.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The SEC quotes the Supreme Court in this regard:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of
judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an
excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities acts and Congress' policy decisions.
Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be over- or
underinclusive.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
91. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. The Regulation lists the
following items:
(i) [e]arnings information; (ii) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or
changes in assets; (iii) new products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers

SEC noted that it "[did] not mean to imply that each of the[] items [listed] is
per se material. 92
The SEC specifically addressed earnings guidance communications with
analysts.93 An issuer who holds a private discussion with an analyst seeking
earnings guidance "takes on a high degree of risk under [the Regulation],"
regardless of whether the earnings are expected to be higher, lower, or equal
to the analyst's guess or whether the information is communicated explicitly
or implicitly. '
The Regulation foreclosed a loophole by which an issuer might have
evaded the Regulation by breaking up material information into immaterial
pieces for selective dissemination. 9 The Regulation specifically provided
that an issuer would not be liable if he disclosed non-material information,
even if the information, when taken together with other information in
possession of the disclosee, was material.' The materiality standard must be
applied to the information actually disclosed, not to the significance of the
information in the "total mix."97 The policy reason behind this allowance
was that analysts play an important role in disseminating company
information to the investing public by "sifting through and extracting
information" whose importance would not be apparent to an ordinary
investor.9"

The fact that an issuer uses a Form 8-K to disclose information will not
be deemed an admission that the information contained in the filing is
material."

or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or loss of a contract); (iv) changes in control or in
management; (v) change in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer
rely on an auditor's audit report; (vi) events regarding the issuer's securities - e.g.,
defaults on senior securities, calls of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock
splits or changes in dividends, changes to the rights of security holders, public or private
sales of additional securities; and (vii) bankruptcies or receiverships.
92. Id. The SEC gives the example that certain new products or contracts might clearly be
material to the issuer, but not all product developments and contracts are material.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 51,721-22.

96.
97.
98.
99.
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b.

"Non-public"

Again, the Regulation does not vary from case law in defining "nonpublic.""w Information that has not been disseminated so that it is available
to investors generally is "non-public."''
c.

"Intentional"

A person acts intentionally "only if the person knows, or is reckless in
not knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both
material and non[-]public."' 2 The Regulation protects issuers by making the
standard subjective.' 3 Although some commenters" requested creation of a
safe harbor provision "for good[] faith efforts to comply with [the]
Regulation" or determinations regarding materiality, the SEC did not create

a safe harbor."'5 The SEC noted that the Regulation "already provides
greater flexibility" than other issuer provisions of federal securities laws
regarding the timing of required disclosures in the event of a mistaken
judgment."' Essentially, the mental state required for violation of the
Regulation is that required for fraud."'7 With respect to fraud, federal courts
have defined recklessness' 8 so that "it is unlikely that issuers engaged in
good[] faith efforts to comply with the [R]egulation will be considered to
have acted recklessly."'

9

100. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723; see also, e.g., infra note
101 and accompanying text.
101. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also generally Investors Management Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 34,9267, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,163 (July 29,
1971) (finding guilty of insider trading a defendant who traded on information privately transmitted
to defendant from an investment banker).
102. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
103. Id. Issuers "need not fear being second-guessed by the Commission ... for mistaken
ld.
I..."
judgments about materiality .
104. Id. (citing comment letters of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, the American
Corporate Counsel Association, and J.P. Morgan).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 976 (1991)); and Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
109. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
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In response to comments received, the SEC emphasized in the final draft
of the Regulation that an individual's failure to make a disclosure would not
be regarded as intentional if the individual did not know that the information
was both material and non-public.' Thus, if a selective disclosure was due
to a mistaken determination of immateriality, "liability [would] arise only if
no reasonable person under the circumstances would have made the same
determination.'"" Finally, the SEC noted that a pattern of "mistakes" as to
materiality or of "unintentional" disclosures followed by a twenty-four hour
time lag before public disclosure would "make less credible the claim that
any particular disclosure was not intentional.""'
d.

"Prompt" Public Disclosure ForNon-Intentional Selective
Disclosures

The Regulation requires "prompt" public disclosure of a non-intentional

selective disclosure."3 "Prompt" was defined in the Regulation to mean "as
soon as reasonably practicable" after an issuer's senior official learns of the
disclosure and knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the disseminated
information is both material and non-public, but not more than the later of
twenty-four hours or commencement of "the next day's trading on the New
York Stock Exchange" after the selective disclosure is made." 4 During the

comment period, the SEC received a variety of responses to the timing
provision of the proposed Regulation."5

Some commenters thought the

timing provision appropriate; ' 6 others felt it too short;"7 still others claimed
the provision was too specific."8 In the final Regulation, the SEC disagreed
with the latter commenters and stated its belief that a clear delineation is

110. Id.
11l.Id. The SEC noted that circumstances play a large part in determining whether an illegal
selective disclosure was made, saying, "We recognize, for example, that a materiality judgment that
might be reckless in the context of a prepared written statement would not necessarily be reckless in
the context of an impromptu answer to an unanticipated question." Id.
112. Id.atn.57.
113. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
114. Id. at 51,722-23. Language about the next trading day was added to the final Regulation to
deal with non-intentional selective disclosures that are discovered on weekends or holidays. For
example, if a senior official learns of a selective disclosure at six p.m. on Friday, public disclosure
must be made before the beginning of trading on the New York Stock Exchange on Monday, not
before six p.m. on Saturday. Id. at 51, 723.
115. Id. at 51,722.
116. Id. (citing for example the letters of the Chicago Board Options Exchange and Gretchen
Sprigg Wisehart).
117. Id. (citing letters of Cleary Gottlieb, Credit Suisse First Boston, Emerson Electric, and
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter).
118. Id. (citing letters of the American Bar Association, the American Corporate Counsel
Association, the National Investor Relations Institute and PR Newswire). These commenters felt
that a less stringent, "as soon as reasonably possible or practicable" standard was appropriate. Id.
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better for both issuers and the investing public. "9 The SEC felt that the
twenty-four hour requirement "strikes the appropriate balance between
achieving broad, non-exclusionary disclosure and permitting issuers time to
determine how to respond after learning of the non-intentional selective
disclosure." '
e.

"PublicDisclosure"

The Regulation does not narrowly define "public disclosure."'"' Instead,
the Regulation attempts to ensure flexibility by allowing issuers to
disseminate information using any of a variety of methods, including filing a
Form 8-K,'2 or "by any other non-exclusionary method or combination of
methods of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public
access," such as allowing public access to conference calls and meetings in
person or via telephone or internet.'
i.

Disclosure using Form 8-K

An issuer who wishes to use Form 8-K to comply with the Regulation
may elect to "file" under Item Five or "furnish" the information under Item
Nine.'24 The Regulation amended Item Five of the Form 8-K so that an Item
Five filing will satisfy the requirements of the Regulation.' The Regulation
also provided that, using Item Nine of the Form 8-K, an issuer might furnish
information to the SEC and the investing public using a Form 8-K without
filing the information.'29 The differences between filing under Item Five and
furnishing under Item Nine are that: (i) information contained in "filings"
under Item Five is (a) "subject to liability under Section Eighteen of the
['34] Act," and (b) "subject to automatic incorporation by reference into the
issuer's ['33] Act registration statements, which are subject to liability under
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the ['33] Act"; but (ii) information "furnished"
under Item Nine is "not subject to liability under Section Eleven of the ['33]

119. Id.
120. Id. at 51,722-23.
121. See generally id. at 51,723-24.
122. See infra Section III(A)(3)(e)(i) and accompanying notes.
123. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723; see infra Section
III(A)(3)(e)(ii) and accompanying notes.
124. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723. The Regulation employs
"file" and "furnish" as terms of art. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
125. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
126. Id.

Act or Section Eighteen of the ['34] Act," unless the issuer includes the
disclosure in a filed (as opposed to furnished) report, proxy statement, or
registration statement.'27 All disclosures on Form 8-K, whether under Item
are "subject to the antifraud provisions of federal
Five or Item Nine,
28
securities laws."'
Commenters expressed fears that disclosure on Form 8-K would be
construed as an admission of materiality. 29 In response, the SEC provided in
the final Regulation that "either filing or furnishing information on Form 8K solely to satisfy [the Regulation] would not, by itself, be deemed an
admission as to the materiality of the information. ' ' 3
ii. Alternative methods of public disclosure

Issuers may employ any method of dissemination of information
"reasonably designed" to ensure public disclosure.'3 ' The SEC listed
acceptable methods of disclosure'3 2 and emphasized that an issuer could use
any combination of methods to disseminate information.'33 The Regulation
set forth a model for a planned disclosure. 3 ' Merely posting information to
an issuer's World Wide Web site would not be sufficient to comply with the
Regulation.'35 The SEC also noted that a departure from an issuer's usual

method of dissemination of information could render the new method
unreasonable.'36

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing for example letters of the American Corporate Counsel Association, the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, the Business Roundtable, Intel, and Dow Chemical).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 51,724. Acceptable methods included "press releases distributed through a widely
circulated news or wire service, or announcements made through press conferences or conference
calls that interested members of the public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephonic
transmission, or by other electronic transmission (including use of the Internet)." Id. The Regulation
states that "[tlhe public must be given adequate notice of the conference or call and the means for
accessing it." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The model was a three-stage plan whereby first the information would be disclosed, then
an announcement of a discussion of the information would be disclosed, and finally, the information
would be publicly discussed. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.For example, if an issuer usually disseminated quarterly earnings results in regular press
releases but suddenly disclosed quarterly earnings in a last minute webcast, the SEC would "view
skeptically [the] issuer's claim" that there was "effective, broad, non-exclusionary public disclosure
of the information." Id.
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4.

Remedies

a. Who can pursue remedyfor alleged violation of the Regulation
The Regulation was an issuer disclosure rule that created duties under
Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the '34 Act and Section 30 of the '40 Act. 37' The
SEC emphasized that the Regulation was not an antifraud provision; nor was
it "designed to create new duties under antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws or in private rights of action.""'3 As such, there was no
private cause of action implied by the Regulation.' 9 Indeed, the Regulation
was drafted to preclude lOb-5 actions that resulted solely from failure to
comply with the Regulation. ° Thus, only the SEC can bring an action for
violation of the Regulation.'4
b.

Remedies

Violation of the Regulation would not render an issuer ineligible to use
so-called "short" Forms S-2, S-3 or S-8.'12 Also, issuers who violate the
Regulation will still be permitted to resell controlled or restricted securities
under Rule 144.7'
Failure to comply with the Regulation will render an issuer subject to an
SEC enforcement action for violation of both the Regulation and Sections
13(a) or 15(d) of the '34 Act or Section 30 of the Company Act. The SEC
might also "bring an administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order,
or a civil action seeking an injunction and/or civil money penalties."'"
When appropriate, the SEC could also bring an action against the
individual(s) at the issuer responsible for the Regulation violation, either for

137. Id. at 51,726.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Of course, if lOb-5 was otherwise violated, the fact that selective disclosure was
incidentally involved in the lOb-5 violation would not preclude the lOb-5 action. Id.
141. See infra Section III(A)(4)(b) and accompanying notes.
142. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725-26.
143. Id. at 51,725-26.
144. Id.
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causing4 ' or for aiding and abetting the violation.'46 The SEC stated that the
severity of the sanctions sought would be directly proportional to the length
of time in which an issuer was in violation of the Regulation.'47
B.

Changes to Insider Trading Rules
1. Definitive Scienter Element to Insider Trading

In the final Regulation, the SEC discussed the historical importance of
insider trading rules. 48' An unsettled issue of insider trading law had been
the level of causal connection a prosecutor was required to show between a
"trader's possession of inside information and his... trading."'4 9 The SEC
had argued, in enforcement cases, that the standard of liability should be
"trading while in 'knowing possession' of the information.""'5 The opposing
view had been that a trader should not be exposed to liability unless it was
shown that the trader "'used' the information for trading."' 5 ' The Supreme
Court had held previously that liability arose when a trader traded "on',152 or
"on the basis of"5 3 inside information, but the Court never addressed the
"knowing possession'/"use" controversy.14 Circuit Courts had split on the
issue."'
The Regulation resolved the ambiguity between "knowing

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3).
Id. at 51,725 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 n.91.
Id. at 51,727. The final Regulation states that
prohibitions against insider trading in our securities laws play an essential role in
maintaining the fairness, health, and integrity of our markets. We have long recognized
that the fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms not only individual investors but
also the very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in the
integrity of the markets. Congress, by enacting two separate laws providing enhanced
penalties for insider trading, has expressed its strong support for our insider trading
enforcement program. [(citing Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98376, 98 Stat. 1264; Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-704,102 Stat.4677)]. And the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan has
recently endorsed a key component of insider trading law, the "misappropriation" theory,
as consistent with the "animating purpose" of the federal securities laws: "to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
149. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
153. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
154. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727.
155. Id. (citing for comparison United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993) (employing a "knowing possession" standard); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d
1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (announcing a median standard whereby "use" must be shown, but
proof of possession gives rise to an inference of use); and United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1069 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999) (holding that "use" must be shown in a
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possession" and "use": the Regulation created an absolute
56 "awareness"
standard based on knowing possession of inside information.
Additionally, the Regulation defines "on the basis of' inside information
to mean that "[a] trade is on the basis of material[,] non[-]public information
if the trader was aware of the material, non[-]public information when the
person made the purchase or sale."'' 7 The SEC stated that this "awareness
standard" "reflects the common sense notion that a trader who is aware of
inside information when making a trading decision inevitably makes use of
the information.""'5 The SEC also felt that this standard "provides greater
clarity and certainty than a presumption or 'strong inference' approach."'59
The SEC noted that "aware" "is a commonly used and well-defined
English
''' °
word, meaning 'having knowledge; conscious; cognizant. ,1
2.

Creation of Affirmative Defenses to Insider Trading

The Regulation created several affirmative defenses to a charge of
insider trading.'6' The objective of these defenses is to provide an
affirmative defense to those who62 can show that inside information was not a
factor in their trading decisions.'
First, a purchase would not be considered to be "on the basis of' inside
information if the person who made the purchase or sale could demonstrate
that before he became aware of the inside information, he "(1) [e]ntered into
a binding contract to purchase or sell the security[;] (2) [i]nstructed another
person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person's account[;]
or (3) [a]dopted a written plan for trading securities."''6 3 The Regulation
closely defined the terms "pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan";
"amount"; "price"; and "date.'"" For example, someone would not be guilty
of insider trading who set forth in writing a plan of trading or exercise of

criminal case)).
156. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at n.105.
161. Id. at51,727.
162. Id. at 51,728.
163. Id. at 51,737; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(l)(A)(l-3) (2000).
164. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,728; see also 17 C.F.R. §
240. 10b5-1 (c)(1) (2000).

employee stock options and gave that plan to an agent, instructing the agent
to trade based on the plan, but later, before the trades were consummated,
became aware of inside information.'65
Second, the Regulation set forth an affirmative defense whereby a
person
other than a natural person... [might] demonstrate that a purchase
or sale of securities [was] not "on the basis of' material non[]public information if the person demonstrate[d] that: (i) the
individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person
to purchase or sell the securities was not aware of the information;
and (ii) [that] person had implemented reasonable policies and
procedures.., to ensure that individuals making investment
decisions would not violate [insider trading laws]."'"
For example, a brokerage firm would not be guilty of insider trading if
someone in the firm knew the inside information, but another employee of
the firm made a trading decision, so long as there was a "Chinese wall"
separating the two employees.'67
3. Existence of Certain Relationships Makes a Person a Per Se
Constructive Insider
The Regulation resolved a split in case law that produced an anomalous
result.'68 The SEC noted that in all of the instances described below, "the
trader's informational advantage stems from 'contrivance, not luck,' and the
information disadvantage to other investors 'cannot be overcome with
research or skill.""'69 Previously, a family member who was a "tippee" as
defined in Dirks v. SEC violated Rule lOb-5,'7" as did a family member who
traded in breach of an express promise of confidentiality.'' However, a
family member who traded in breach of a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality did not violate Rule lOb-5.' The Regulation created a duty
of trust or confidence (i) as a result of express agreement; (ii) where there
existed a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences; and (iii)
between spouses, parents, children, and siblings.'79 The SEC stated that the
165. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(l)(iii) (2000).
166. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,728; see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.1 0b5- I (c)(2)(i-ii) (2000).
167. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2)(i-ii) (2000).
168. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,729.
169. Id. at 51,729 (quoting O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59).
170. See generally Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646.
171. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,729.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 51,730.
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relationships described in (i) and (ii) above could arise between any people,
including step-siblings and domestic partners.'74 The reason that only
spousal, parental, and sibling relationships were singled out for specific
enumeration in the Regulation was that "most instances of insider trading
between or among family members involve spouses, parents and children, or
siblings."'7
IV. IMPACT

A.

ConjecturedImpact PriorTo Effectivity

During the comment period, nearly six thousand groups and individuals
commented on the proposed regulation to the SEC."6 Opinion varied
widely. 7 Small investors lauded the proposed regulation, claiming that it
Armed with all the latest news about a
would level the playing field.'
company, investors would be able to make their own decisions, freed from
the tyranny of favored Wall Street analysts and publications.'79 Small
investors would be empowered to jump off a sinking ship before steerage
was flooded: they wouldn't be forced to sit helplessly watching the price of a
stock crash, wondering if it was a market blip or a reaction to information
other people had.'80
Analysts, industry insiders, and securities attomeys darkly predicted a
number of apocalyptic outcomes of the proposed regulation.' 8 ' Industry
professionals feared that the ban on selective disclosure, long an integral
element of Wall Street relationships between issuers and analysts on one
side and the press on the other side, would have a chilling effect on

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 51,717.
177. E.g. Hasset, supra note 19; and Robert J. Shiller, Outlaw Selective Disclosure? Yes, Markets
Must be Fair,WALL. ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at A18.
178. The Motley Fool, Victorious Disclosure, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2000, at 4D.
179. See Bill Barnhart, Fair Disclosure Rule Dilutes Analyst Advantage, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20,
2000, at 3.
180. See Jeff Brown, Investors In the Know: SEC's Full-DisclosureRegulation Aims to Level the
Playing Fieldfor Regular Folks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2000, at 3.
181. Michael Schroeder and Randall Smith, Disclosure Rule Cleared By the SEC - Wall Street
Firms Say FairnessIssue Skirted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl; see also Criticism of Reg. FD
Continues - Disclosure Regulation Needs More Work, Trade Organizations Say, INVESTOR REL.

Bus., Sept. 11, 2000; Rick Appin, SEC's Fair DisclosureRegulation Controversialfor HY Market,
HIGH YIELD REP., Sept. 19, 2000.

information. 82 If companies could no longer selectively disclose, they
would not disclose at all. 83 Additionally, it was suggested that the
Regulation would lead to market volatility. " Small investors, lacking
educational backgrounds in finance and frequently lacking a complete
understanding of markets and securities generally,'85 would react quickly and
drastically to information that was, in actuality, innocuous.
Since the Regulation was enacted, companies have changed their
policies in anticipation of the Regulation's effectiveness. 86
Some
companies, typically those in the technology industry, have moved to
webcast their conference calls.' 7 This approach has been criticized,
however.'88 Not all investors are savvy enough to take advantage of Internetbased dissemination of information. '89 This criticism is without force,
however, because there will always be some investors who will not have the
means to instantly access a particular method of dissemination of
information, whether by press release, World Wide Web site publication, or
SEC filing."' A stronger criticism is that these webcasted conference calls
will not be the same as the private conference calls.'9 ' Instead, these

182. See Kris Frieswick, Information ForAll- Will Companies Clam Up?, CFO, THE MAGAZINE
FOR SENIOR FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES, Sept. 1, 2000, at 22; see also Matt Roush, Public Companies
Can't Inform Only FavoredAnalysts, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Sept. 11, 2000, at 7; and Healthcare
IR Communication In the New Age of Fair Disclosure, HEALTHCARE PR & MARKETING NEWS,
Sept. 14, 2000.
183. A recent survey conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute indicated that fortytwo percent of the companies surveyed "will probably limit communication practices," and
additional twelve percent said "they would limit their practices 'significantly"' in response to the
Regulation. Shareholder.com, NIRI Survey Finds Adoption of Regulation Full Disclosure Likely to
Limit Amount of Information Disclosed To Market Participants, available at
http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/EA080800.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
184. Thomas Coyle, A "Pleasant Surprise" On Earnings?, UPSIDE TODAY, Sept. 14, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 4725763.
185. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Smart Investors Let Others Do the Work,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2000, at A23.
186. See Healthcare PR & Mktg. News, supra note 182; see also, e.g., Joseph Weber, Full
Disclosure For All: The Web Allows Corporations To Share Information Quickly and Cheaply,
BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 106 (outlining American Home Products Corp.'s new corporate
policy with respect to disclosure of vital corporate news).
187. Weber, supra note 186.
188. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
189. See Sam Ali, New Disclosure Rule Eludes Low-Tech Investors, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 6, 2000, at 25 (reporting the filing of a lawsuit by the American Association of Retired
Persons (the "AARP") against the SEC, charging that the Regulation does not protect investors who
are unable to use the Internet).
190. Id. An SEC spokesperson addressed the AARP's concerns in a statement in the article.
191. Investor Relations Business, supra note 181.
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conference calls will be little more than scripted statements.'92 Certainly,
analysts9 3 may ask questions, but the company might simply refuse to
answer.
B.

The First Year Post-Effectivity

1. Less Quantity and Quality of Disclosure Since Effectivity
As discussed above, prior to the Regulation's becoming effective, both
commenters and media alike anticipated that the Regulation would have a
chilling effect on companies' disclosure."' This fear has been realized to
some extent. United Airlines ("United") claims that before the Regulation
was enacted, United "gave out more information than other airlines."''
However, United has used the Regulation as an excuse to stop disclosing any
information the Regulation does not require.' 9 Similarly, before the
Regulation, Sears Roebuck ("Sears") "'would give [analysts] sales
estimates, credit, gross-margin trends. They were very explicit about it."" 97
After the Regulation went into effect, Sears "'clammed up for the fourth
' 99
quarter, and there [was] almost [no earnings guidance] for the next year."
On the other hand, some mutual fund firms have reacted to the Regulation
by increasing the size of their research teams, worrying that "companies
[will release] a lot of unimportant information just so they won't have to
worry about saying the wrong thing."' 99

Anecdotal evidence supports this uneasiness."t "Conference calls are
laden with arcane questions, chock-a-block full of statistics and minutiae so
inside-baseball that 'your eyes glaze over'," reported one analyst. 9 ' Another

192. Weber, supra note 186.
193. Dennis Taylor, SEC Brewing Rules That Could Affect Disclosure, PUGET SOUND BUs. J.,
Mar. 17, 2000, at 31A.
194. See supra, Section IV(A) and accompanying notes; see also supra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text.
195. Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Low, Analysts' Earnings Estimates Are Diverging, and
SEC Disclosure Rule May Be the Reason, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2000, at C2.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Michael Exstein, a retail analyst at CSFB).
198. Id.
199. Allison Bisbey Colter, FundFirms Strengthen Research Teams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at
C19.
200. See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
201. Jeff D. Opdyke, Individuals Pick Up on Conference Calls, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000, at CI
(quoting Denise Farkas, a partner at Spero-Smith Investment Advisers).
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complained that "instead of asking 'big strategic questions' in...
conference calls .... she now has 'to ask dumb questions about tweaking the
tax rate by [twenty] basis points." 2 2 Conference calls have consistently run
past the time allotted for them because executives discuss "corporate trivia"
for hours on end."' The reason for this is that "corporate investor-relations
officials worry that answering what sounds like a simple question will
constitute an SEC violation, because nearly everything a company does can
affect earnings estimates."" ' Thus, although "there has been a dramatic
increase in telephone and webcast conference calls open to the public and
analysts alike,"2"5 the quality of the information disseminated has decreased
as the quantity has increased. Everything may affect earnings estimates, but
the information is meaningless to many small investors.2" Small investors
were admonished in one Wall Street Journal article to draw conclusions
based upon the investors' determination of whether the "analysts sound[ed]
really concerned about something."2 7 The goal of the Regulation was to
level the playing field.00 It is difficult to comprehend how, by requiring
small investors to go from benefiting from analysts' reports to attempting to
guess if analysts "sound really concerned," the playing field has been
leveled.
2.

Share Price Volatility Has Resulted

Additionally, as commenters and the media feared,2" the Regulation has
resulted in greater volatility of share prices. Analysts' estimates have varied
more since effectivity of the Regulation because analysts use less
information and more inferences in creating their estimates. 21' As a result,
the estimates, already greatly varied, may be completely erroneous, resulting
in share prices reacting first to each earnings forecast and then to the actual

202. Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turns Analysts'
Rite into a Hectic Affair, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at C I (quoting Heather May Murren, a Merrill
Lynch consumer products analyst).
203. Id.
204. Miriam Hill, New Rule Aims To Keep Investors In the Know But Wall Street Analysts Wonder
How It Will Affect Their Work, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2000, at 3.
205. Andrew Leckey, Investors May Choose Better As Word Gets Out, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2000,
at 1.
206. See Opdyke, supra note 201.
207. Id.
208. See Arthur Levitt, Opening Statement at the Open Meeting on Regulation Fair Disclosure,
Aug. 10, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldisal.htm.
209. See Section IV(A), supra and accompanying notes.
210. See Hill, supra note 204.
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earnings news from the company."' Additionally, volatility may be caused
by insiders trading on news that is not inside information but also is not
subject to wide disclosure."
Gateway's share price performance this fall illustrates this volatility.2 3
First, Wit Soundview downgraded Gateway, and the share price slid.24
Gateway responded that "[they were] confident that [their] sales ... [were]
ramping at expected levels."2 5 Nine days later, the company announced that
"dismal Thanksgiving sales would cause fourth-quarter earnings to be [forty
percent] less than expected, and the chill descending on consumer purchases
of personal computers would hammer next year's sales, too." 2' 6 In response,
Gateway's share price fell thirty-six percent."7
3. Predictions in early 2001
The Regulation will likely have a large impact on the market. For
example, on September 22, 2000, Intel's shares dropped twenty-two percent,
based on the chip-maker's warning that revenues would be weaker than
anticipated." 8 Intel had previously put in place policies compliant with the
Regulation, before the Regulation went into effect.2 9 In the past, Intel might
have arranged for a narrower circulation of the news, which would have
enabled company insiders, key investors, and clients of favored analysts to
get out before the share price plunged.
In the short term, the Regulation will result in market volatility, as the
Intel and Gateway stories illustrate.2 ° Securities attorneys will profit from
the increased guidance required by their clients.' To be on the safe side,

211. Id.
212. See Cassell Bryan-Low, SEC Weighs Electronic Filing of Insider Trades To Help Push the
System Into the Internet Age, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at C 1.
213. See Greg Ip, Stocks Pay PriceFor Firms' Excessive Optimism: More Profit Reversals Could
Undermine the Market Further,WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2000, at Cl.
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting John Todd, Chief Financial Officer of Gateway).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Molly Williams and Robert McGough, Intel's Jolt Shows Shifts in Market's Dynamics - New
Disclosure Rules Mean More Legwork Ahead ForAnalysts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at Cl.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 213-219 and accompanying text.
221. Ellen L. Rosen, FD'sAftermath: Busy Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at B 1.

companies will likely avoid making any disclosures.2 Instead of reacting to
analyst leaks and expectations statements, as well as earnings
announcements, prices will react only to earnings announcements.
In the long term, however, the Regulation will be just one more hoop for
reporting companies to jump through. As securities attorneys observe
enforcement of the Regulation and read No-Action Letters and Releases
relating to the Regulation, they will devise ways their clients can avoid both
compliance with goals of the Regulation and enforcement actions for
violating the Regulation. Nearly seventy years of securities legislation has
shown that there is no magic law that will level the playing field. Moreover,
the ineffectiveness of this law due to failure to create a private cause of
action or to ban violators from using a short form in future registrations223
ensures that the only parties to benefit from the Regulation will be securities
lawyers. As a National Law Journal article wittily suggested, the Regulation
ought to have been called FE, for "full employment" for securities attorneys,
due to the amount of attorney time required to determine whether each
disclosure is adequately made.22"
However, the long term future of the Regulation is in doubt. In the
beginning of 2001, Arthur Levitt, chairman of the SEC during the Clinton
administration, agreed to step down to clear the way for President Bush to
appoint his own SEC chairman. 25 The Regulation was Levitt's baby2 6 and
opposed by many in the securities industry."7 As early as November 10,
2000, attendees at a Securities Industry Association convention speculated
that, if Bush were elected and Levitt stepped down, the Regulation would be
rolled back.
C. One Year Later229

1. The Unger Report
On April 24, 2001, Laura Unger, then acting chairman of the SEC,
convened four separate panels of issuers, analysts, investors, and
information disseminators to discuss their experiences to date with the

222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
See supra Section HI(A)(4)(b) and accompanying notes.
Rosen, supra note 221.
Michael Schroeder, SEC Chief's Valediction: Beware Of the Investment World's Pitfalls,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at C 1.
226. See id.; see also Levitt, supra note 208.
227. See supra, Section IV(A) and accompanying notes.
228. Looking Ahead, WALL ST. J., November 10, 2000, at C1 6.
229. The sections discussing the Unger Report and the new corporate disclosure rules were added
in March 2002, one year after the rest of the article was drafted.
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Regulation.23 The result of these roundtables, as reported in Commissioner
Unger's report, are that the SEC should (i) provide more guidance regarding
the materiality standard; (ii) "make it easier for issuers to use technology to
satisfy" the Regulation; and (iii) listen to what issuers are saying about the
effect of the Regulation."' Of these three issues, the last tracks most closely
with the predicted impact of the Regulation. The early anecdotal evidence
summarized above was born out in the report: Polly Pearson, Vice President
of Global Investors Relations of EMC Corp., in a statement representative of
other issuers who attended the Roundtable, said,
[W]hat [the Regulation) is doing is it is throwing [investors and
analysts] in the arms of the absolute worst spokesperson for good
communication about your shares, i.e., a random salesperson for
that company. So what we are having happen is sell side analysts
might just unearth a random salesperson and ask them how the
quarter is or ask them how margins are, or "Hey, did you do much
golfing this quarter?" Anything they can do to get a pulse on the
quarter. And that elevates volatility.
Or sell side might do a survey of 50 people and say it represents our
whole business, and it is erroneous data based on a subset of the
world, whereas if they asked the corporate office, we could give
them a much more thoughtful answer. So the perception of reality
of Reg FD means corporations might be clamming up; therefore, go
find a random employee and have them spill their guts. And it is
one of our ongoing biggest challenges is how to train our
"Don't talk to investors about the company, send them
salespeople,
232
to us."
The confusion reported by issuers is made less troubling for companies
by the SEC's reticence to bring any cases for violations of the Regulation.233
However, "issuers and their corporate counsel have taken little comfort from

230. COMM'NR LAURA S. UNGER, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REVISITED,
December 2001, at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm [hereinafter "Unger Report"]
231. Id.
232. Transcript of Regulation FD Roundtable, Alexander Hamilton U.S. Customs House
Auditorium, New York, New York, April 24, 2001, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/regfdconf.txt [hereinafter "Transcript"].
233. Unger Report, supra note 230.

the [SEC]'s assurance at the Roundtable and in subsequent public statements
that they would only authorize cases of clear-cut violations involving
unquestionably material information." '34
2.

Enron Fallout

In the months following Enron's meltdown, 3 ' many have recused
themselves from the investigation into Enron's demise, including Attorney
General John Ashcroft, whose department will investigate the Enron players
for criminal wrongdoing. 3 ' SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt is not among the
ranks of a senator... and several attorneys general recusing themselves from
Enron investigations. This is facially logical: those who have recused
themselves, together with the majority of congressmen and senators and the
President, received campaign contributions from Enron.23 Chairman Pitt
came from twenty years of private practice at Fried Frank Harris Shriver &
Jacobson to the SEC, so there are not any campaign contributions about
which to worry.239 However, in those decades of practice, Chairman Pitt did
legal work for Arthur Andersen, Enron's auditor, as well as a wide array of
big corporations and investment banks.40 Legal ethics prevent Chairman Pitt
from using the information he gained while serving those clients in the
private sector,2' but the recent miasma of distrust pervading Washington will
provide a breeding ground for suspicions that Chairman Pitt is using
information gained in private practice every time the SEC opens an
investigation or brings an enforcement action. As one New York securities
lawyer described it, "'It's impossible to see Harvey Pitt as anything but
Prometheus bound. Pitt is shackled to a rock, and the harpies are going to
come and pick his guts out."'"
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Recently, Prometheus attempted to fight off the harpies: on February 13,
2002, Chairman Pitt announced his intent to change corporate disclosure
rules to improve financial reporting and disclosure.2 43 The new disclosure
rules include provisions to:
* Provide accelerated reporting by companies of transactions by company
insiders in company securities, including transactions with the company;
" Accelerate filing by companies of their quarterly and annual reports;
* Expand the list of significant events requiring current disclosure on
existing Form 8-K. Such events could include changes in rating agency
decisions, obligations that are not currently disclosed and lock-out
periods affecting employee stock-ownership plans;
" Add a requirement that public companies post their Exchange Act
reports on their web sites at the same time they are filed with the SEC;
and
" Require disclosure of critical accounting policies in Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, contained in annual reports. 2"
At first blush, the rules, which appear tailored to preventing another
company exactly like Enron from doing exactly what Enron did, seem
beneficial. However, the rules, as they stand in proposed form, are subject
to some of the same criticisms offered against Regulation FD: these new
rules will also increase market volatility, for exactly the same reasons.
Inexperienced, unsophisticated investors will overreact to a company's
releasing any of the information listed in the press release, thinking they are
holding securities in another Enron. Given Chairman Pitt's rush to create
more, rather than fewer, disclosure regulations, it seems unlikely that the
hope of a year ago, that a Republican SEC would rescind Regulation FD,
will be realized.

243. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, SEC To Propose New Corporate
Disclosure Rules (Feb. 13,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
corpdiscrules.htm.
244. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Regulation FD attempted to provide a level playing field by requiring
issuers to publicly disclose any information they privately disclose. 5 It has
resulted in confusion among issuers as to how to avoid investigation or7
6
enforcement actions by the SEC; a glut of information, mostly useless;24
an increased skill level in the gamesmanship of analysts; 48 and, without
doubt or need for anecdotal evidence, higher legal bills. 9 It seems that the
only thing that has changed is the amount of securities regulation operating
on American markets. The investors are no better off; the analysts are no
worse off; the lawyers are the only ones who may have benefited. Although
the author is personally in favor of lawyers benefiting, ° it is difficult to see
how a regulation that does nothing other than increase paperwork, red tape,
and legal fees fulfills the SEC's mission to protect investors and maintain
market efficiency. The existence of the new corporate disclosure rules
appears to close the door on any potential rescission of the Regulation.f'
For good or ill, it appears Regulation FD is here to stay.
Joanna E. Barnes
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